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ill Dewald said he invited me to
comment at this conference because of
my practical expertise in formulating
and implementing monetary policy.  So it is
from that perspective that I will address sev-
eral questions raised by the Anderson and
Rasche paper.
The ﬁrst and perhaps most important
question is Why does the base get so little
attention from central banks in shaping
their monetary policies?  Although the Swiss
National Bank has a long-term, multi-year,
monetary base target, it has allowed the base
to deviate appreciably from its target path
for extended periods.  The Bank of England
has a guideline for growth in the base that is
considered likely to be consistent with
achieving its inﬂation objective, but it does
not appear to place very much weight on
this particular indicator.  
In the United States we paid quite a bit
of attention to nonborrowed reserves from
1979 to 1982 but very little thereafter to
aggregate measures of reserves or the base.
The Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) has considered using the base as
an intermediate indicator from time to time.
President Melzer brought a proposal to the
Committee in 1988 to establish a band for
monetary base growth, with the idea that
the Open Market Committee would react
very strongly if the base got on either side of
the band.  But the Committee rejected that
proposal, largely because, for a  variety of
reasons I’ll go into later, it had little
conﬁdence in the indicator properties of this
aggregate.  About four years ago there was
another push within the Federal Reserve to
see if we could come up  with a  quantitative
target for open market operations or an
intermediate indicator.  That effort also
came to naught, and the base has not been
the subject of discussion in the FOMC for
several years.  In sum, aside perhaps from
Switzerland, central banks haven’t used the
base in formulating monetary policy, and the
question is why.  The second question I
want to discuss is whether the proposals of
Anderson and Rasche will help make the
base more useful for monetary policy.
WHY SO LITTLE ATTENTION
TO THE BASE?
Some academic critics of the Federal
Reserve have argued that the lack of
emphasis on the base in the United States
has resulted  mostly from the central bank’s
inability to see obvious correlations between
the base and income, and partly from
bureaucratic unwillingness to give up the
powers of discretionary policymaking.
From my perspective, there have been a
number of valid reasons for ignoring the
base, at least in the United States.  For one,
with regard to money/income relation-
ships, the base has, over time, been
dominated by other deﬁnitions of money.  In
the 1960s and 1970s, for example, M1
seemed to be a better money supply-type
indicator of the thrust of monetary policy.
In the 1980s, M2 was a better leading indi-
cator of nominal income.  Most of the
empirical tests I am aware of would tend 
to support the conclusion that there has
been a tighter relationship between those
aggregates and income than there was
between the base and income.  In these 
circumstances, if you are looking for a quan-
titative intermediate guide to policy, why
focus on the base, which is an ingredient
producing money?  Why not use some 
measure of money itself?
Over the 1980s, reasons for questioning
the usefulness of the base as an inter-
mediate policy indicator in the United
States increased.  Foreign currency ﬂows
began to play a greater role in our base
growth.  In addition, the reserve portion of
the base became more interest- sensitive,
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nationwide.  In fact, the whole relationship
of base to income seemed to change about
the time of this deregulation.  A paper by
Bob Rasche, given at a Federal Reserve
conference in 1987, demonstrated a shift
in the velocity relationship of narrow
aggregates in 1981.  Subsequent work of
his has tended to reach other conclusions,
but these disparate ﬁndings do demon-
strate the uncertainty about this point.  To
the Federal Reserve, it appeared as we
went through the 1980s that something
had happened to the base-income relation-
ship.  Base velocity became more variable,
the trend changed, and with uncertainty
about future relationships policymakers
were not enthusiastic about using the base
as an intermediate indicator.  Those
concerns were not overcome by the adap-
tive base targeting rules of McCallum and
Meltzer.  To be sure, these rules would
allow the Federal Reserve to adjust for
shifts in base velocity, but the adjustments
would be fairly slow, potentially producing
considerable variation in income and
interest rates while base growth targets
caught up to changes in velocity. 
One of the reasons people give for
targeting the base is that it is the measure
the Federal Reserve affects directly;
decisions we make every day about open
market operations produce the base.  This
type of argument hasn’t carried much weight
because the base has been endogenous to
Federal Reserve operating procedures.  That
is, the FOMC has set a borrowed reserve or
interest rate target, and the base is entirely
determined by demand at the resulting
interest rates and income.  Control of the
base has been subordinated to the control of
interest rates.  Given questions about the
relationship of the base to income, there has
been very little appetite for making the base
exogenous.  Targeting reserves or the base
directly would put considerable variation in
interest rates, with very little assurance that
nominal income would be any smoother or
closer to a desired path.
Over the 1980s and 1990s, the use of
any quantitative indicators in monetary
policy has eroded considerably.  Innovation,
deregulation, and advances in technology
seem to have changed the character of con-
ventionally measured money supplies.
Lower transaction costs have blurred the
lines between one kind of asset and another;
for example, households now shift easily
and cheaply between stock and bond
mutual funds, which aren’t in any of the Ms,
and deposits. Partly as a consequence, M2
velocity increased unexpectedly in the early
1990s, and policymakers, particularly after
that episode, became very skeptical about
whether stable and useful relationships
would be reestablished between broad mon-
etary aggregates and income.
The base hasn’t emerged as a viable
alternative to the broad money aggregates
because, in the 1990s, questions about its
velocity were multiplying even beyond
those confronted in the 1980s.  Foreign
demand for U.S. currency has become
much stronger and more variable in the
1990s, distorting the behavior of base
velocity.  This change is attributable in part
to ﬂows to Latin America, where some
countries have begun to use dollars and
domestic currency interchangeably.  It also
has arisen from the use of dollars in many
countries in the former Soviet Union.  The
Federal Reserve staff estimates the amount
of U.S. currency in foreign hands, but the
absence of direct evidence means that such
estimates are not particularly reliable.
At the same time, sweep accounts, 
in which balances in NOW accounts are
swept periodically and automatically 
into savings accounts, have been reducing
required reserves, further affecting the
velocity of the base.  Through May 1996,
nearly $100 billion of M1 had been lost 
to sweeps.  These estimates are based on
the initial amounts swept by each bank;
we do not have the data to track the
volume of deposits swept each week 
by institutions that initiated such a 
process some time ago.  Sweeping has
resulted in a decline in the base of 
approximately $9 billion to $10 billion.
This decline has had no impli-cations
whatsoever for the volume of transactions
undertaken with NOW accounts or
demand deposits and hence no relationship
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base velocity.
As Dick Anderson noted, sweeps will
spread further, so that, eventually, essentially
no institutions, or very few, will be effec-
tively bound by reserve requirements.
There are already some very large commer-
cial banks that are not economically
bound—banks whose deposits are not
effectively constrained by the amount of
required reserves they hold.  Instead, the
last dollar of deposits held at the Federal
Reserve by such an institution is for
clearing purposes—to avoid overdrafts in
the institution’s Federal Reserve account or
to meet a prearranged clearing balance
requirement.  As the conventional time for
the close of business draws near, when the
Federal Reserve measures deposits and
reserves, the size of the balance such a
depository wants to hold at the Federal
Reserve depends more on its expectations
for unanticipated end-of-day shocks to its
account than on the level of deposits.  The
depository can track what is in its account
through the day, and, absent a required
clearing balance, it would seek a closing
balance above zero only to avoid Federal
Reserve overdraft penalties in the event
that adverse clearings result in an overdraft
late in the day.  Banks also incur economic
penalties for holding excess reserves, in
that they lose the interest those funds
would otherwise earn.  
The shift to holding reserves for clearing
purposes has potentially important implica-
tions for open market operations  and the
reserve markets.  In the new situation, the
demand for reserves throughout  the day will
depend more on daily clearings—or what
banks think daily clearings will be and what
kind of shocks might hit their accounts at
the end of the day.  It is a day-by-day demand
for reserves.  In contrast, when reserve
requirements are binding, the demand is
determined by an average need over a two-
week reserve maintenance period, or even
longer, allowing for limited carry-forward of
reserve excesses and deﬁciencies.  When
reserve demands are driven by daily clearing
needs, banks will be unwilling to arbitrage
across individual days.  That is, they will not
act to stabilize the funds rate by holding
extra reserves when rates are low, and fewer
reserves when rates are higher.  Without
averaging, reserve demands are difﬁcult to
gauge, and without arbitrage, surprises in
reserve demands and in the Federal Reserve’s
balance sheet tend to show through to the
federal funds market.  As a consequence, fed-
eral funds rates could become very volatile.
Increased use  of required clearing balances
would restore, to a degree, the incentives and
ability to average or arbitrage, but to date
such increases have been modest, and we do
not know whether they will provide an ade-
quate cushion. 
We have not experienced high volatility
from the recent drop in required reserves,
though a little more variation in funds rates
is evident from time to time, and banks’
adaptation to the new environment may be
affecting aggregate reserve demands within a
maintenance period.  In early 1991, however,
after a reduction in reserve requirements, the
level of required reserves fell to below com-
fortable clearing levels, and volatility in federal
funds rates increased substantially, not only
on a day-to-day basis, but intra-day as well.
Increased volatility would not be important
if, say, three-month rates and policy trans-
mission were largely unaffected.  But we
don’t know what will happen as sweeps
spread.  At one level, the erosion of the effec-
tive constraint of reserve requirements could
affect the way open market operations need
to be conducted to keep funds rate volatility
from disrupting markets.  Already, since the
1991 episode, the Desk has been monitoring
projected deposits at the Federal Reserve rel-
ative to required operating balances—the
total of reserve requirements and required
clearing balances and also relative to some
notion of what banks desire to hold for
clearing purposes on a daily basis.
SHOULD THE BASE INCLUDE
CLEARING BALANCES?
The spread of sweeps, as Anderson and
Rasche say, has important implications for
how the reserve base interacts with total
deposits.  They propose including clearing
balances in the St. Louis measure of the
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coincides closely with that of the Federal
Reserve open market managers.  Such an
inclusion cannot deal with distortions in the
base/deposit multiplier as sweeps are
instituted.  Only 16 percent or 17 percent of
the decline in required reserves has been
offset by an increase in required clearing bal-
ances.  Hence the expanded base has been
declining for given levels of deposits and
transactions.  It’s highly unlikely that any
adjustment could adequately deal with the
transition period.
Moreover, considerable skepticism
seems in order as to whether the new mone-
tary base will have a reasonably stable
relationship with money and income once
the adjustment to sweeps is completed.  The
relationship between clearing balances and
the volume of transactions, deposits, or
income is very complex, because the
demands for operating balances depend pri-
marily on what the banks expect to happen
at the very end of the day, not the volume of
transactions during the day or the level of
deposits at close of business.  
A number of factors that do not bear on
deposits or nominal spending might affect
desired end-of-day balances.  For example,
the relationship of the growth of the base to
the expansion of nominal GDP might
depend on the relative proportion of real
growth and inﬂation.  The amount of
balances a bank might want to hold at the
end of the day should be closely related to
the price level.  Inﬂation will presumably
affect the size of unexpected end-of-day
transactions and demand for the base.  What
is less clear is how the amount of balances
and the size of those transactions are related
to growth in real income.  An increase in
real income might not have a proportionate
effect on the size of individual transactions
or their end-of-day volume.  
A second factor interfering with the
base/deposit relationship could be the 
proportion of clearing done through com-
mercial banks versus that done directly
through the Federal Reserve.  If a 
bank chose to take its clearing business
away from the Fed and put it in a
correspondent bank, presumably it would
reduce or eliminate its clearing balances
at the Federal Reserve.  Whether the corre-
spondent would have to raise its clearing
balances at the Federal Reserve by an
amount equal to the drop of the ﬁrst bank
is an open question.  It would not if there
are, in effect, economies of scale in holding
clearing balances.  In this case, the choice
by commercial banks as to where to do
their clearing—the Federal Reserve or the
private sector—would have an important
effect on the level of balances desired at
the end of the day relative to deposits and
spending.
Similarly, a third inﬂuence might be
the structure of the banking system.  As
the number of depositories drops substan-
tially and branching becomes more
prevalent, consolidation of reserves
management and clearing accounts will
internalize a lot of transactions that now
pass through the Federal Reserve.  This
should reduce the amount of clearing bal-
ances needed at the end of the day.
Another potential factor is banks’ willing-
ness to use the discount window.  In
avoiding overdrafts, willingness to borrow
at the discount window substitutes for
end-of-day balances.  Hence, the relation-
ship of these balances to deposits and to
transactions will depend on attitudes
toward using the  discount window.
Finally, one factor that Anderson and
Rasche addressed is the level of interest
rates.  Required balances, as Anderson
noted, have been sensitive to the level of
interest rates.  It’s true that, as they derive
in their paper, this sensitivity does not
subvert the use of the base as an indicator,
but it does create problems in interpreting
such an indicator.  For example, when M1
became very interest-sensitive, it became a
much less useful guide to monetary policy
because its velocity became more variable
over the business cycle.  The interest elas-
ticities of money demand do enter into
considerations of whether to emphasize
money or interest rates as intermediate
policy targets.
I don’t want to be too negative on this
paper.  It is a ﬁrst-rate contribution.
Anderson and Rasche are working along
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increasingly important in daily open
market operations.  They have a number of
very interesting hypotheses about how
bank balances at the Federal Reserve
would interact with the payments system,
the amount of deposits, total transactions,
and income as reserve balances change
character.  They are, in effect, building a
data base to help test those hypotheses.
Although I may be skeptical about the out-
come of those tests, it is important that
they be done.
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